Aha Dua Permata: Scott Ritter - Israeli Assault on Gaza is Doomed to Fail

Scott Ritter - Israeli Assault on Gaza is Doomed to Fail

Scott Ritter
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Israel has amassed some 300,000 troops, armed with tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and artillery, and supported by helicopters and fixed wing aircraft.

Their mission is to secure the perimeter around Gaza to make sure that Hamas fighters are not able to sortie forth and commit atrocities against the citizens of Israel like those that occurred on October 7 and 8. At some point it is estimated that these troops will be ordered into Gaza for the purpose of destroying Hamas as an organization. But the sad fact is that the Israeli Army today is not up to such a mission. It lacks the training and fortitude for a task like that, regardless of outcome, and will cost Israel thousands of lives if seen to fruition. Any Israeli assault on Gaza is doomed to fail before it even begins.

A short look back at the preparedness and training of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) helps underscore the reasoning behind such a bleak assessment. Earlier this year, over the course of two weeks, stretching from late May through early June, the IDF carried out a massive exercise, code named “Firm Hand,” which tested the Israeli capability to wage war on multiple fronts. Like a similar exercise held the year before, code named “Chariots of Fire,” the “Firm Hand” event focused on a major air campaign being waged against Iran, and a major ground war being waged against Hezbollah, in northern Israel/southern Lebanon. Both exercises envisioned that there would be outbreaks of localized violence in the West Bank and along the Gaza Strip that would need to be contained by forces allocated to the Central and Southern military commands, respectively.

The focus of effort for both exercises was the Northern Command, and more specifically, the border with Lebanon. There, beyond the border, were located the forces of Hezbollah, a Lebanese political party which maintained a militia larger, better trained, and better equipped than most armies. Israel fought a 34-day war with Hezbollah in August 2006, pitting a force that had grown to over 30,000 troops, backed by tanks, artillery, helicopters, and fixed wing aircraft, against a lightly armed unit of around 3,000 fighters.

The war was an unmitigated disaster for the IDF. Hezbollah commanders found that Israeli troops were by and large poorly organized and disciplined, with very little training that was relevant to the rigors of modern war. Israeli tank operators were unfamiliar with tactics relevant to the terrain they were operating in, leaving themselves open to Hezbollah attacks that ended up destroying 20 of Israel’s vaunted Merkava tanks.

Israel has been struggling to overcome the stain of its 2006 defeat at the hands of Hezbollah. In 2016, the IDF embarked on Project Gideon, a five-year plan designed to reconfigure and retrain the Israeli Army so that it would not repeat the mistakes of 2006. When Project Gideon was completed, Israel then embarked on what it called the “Tnufa” (“Momentum”) plan, intended to build on the changes effected under Project Gideon. Part of the Tnufa plan is something called Ground Horizon, a series of technical innovations designed to make Israeli ground forces more effective.

The IDF forces participating in both the Chariots of Fire and Firm Hand exercises had been at the receiving end of the Project Gideon/Tnufa/Ground Horizon changes. Two of the IDF’s premier units, the 91st “Galilee” Division, responsible for defending against Hezbollah from Lebanon, and the 36th Ga’ash (“Golan”) Armored Division, which is responsible for the Syrian border, took the lead in the exercises. They carried out a multidivisional exercise where they conducted combined arms training against a Hezbollah-like foe.

The Central Command and Southern Command practiced several counterterrorism exercises which emphasized the security of residents in Judea and Samaria. When the Firm Hand exercise was completed, the IDF high command declared it a success.

They had not exercised against an event like the Hamas attacks of October 7-8 of this year.

Urban combat is extraordinarily difficult. It is made even more so when a defender can settle in amongst the rubble of a destroyed city. Ask the Germans at Stalingrad. Ask the French, British, Indians, and Poles who fought at Monte Casino. Ask either the Ukrainians or Russians about Mariupol and Artemovsk (Bakhmut).

The Israeli military today is more comfortable making TikTok videos and posting Instagram photographs than they are in perfecting the skillsets needed to close with and destroy your enemy through firepower and maneuver. This is a military that, with a few exceptions found in the elite reconnaissance units of the IDF, has grown accustomed to a peacetime ritual more akin to the life of a corrections officer than soldier. The IDF has become experts at arresting children, beating up women, and murdering unarmed men.

Digging a competent enemy out of the rubble of a destroyed city, especially when they have prepared and organized for such a battle, is deadly work. The Israeli troops who have been assembled outside of Gaza are not ready for this fight. They are not trained or equipped for this fight. They are not psychologically prepared for this fight.